The THTR Circulars from 2007

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THTR Circular No. 118, Dec. 2007

Nuclear gangsters!

Brutal attack on the South African nuclear research center Pelindaba, where BRD companies produce nuclear fuel for the high-temperature reactor. Fight in the control center
There, with the help of the German companies NUKEM (Alzenau), Uhde (Dortmund), SGL Carbon (Wiesbaden, Meitingen), Essener high pressure tube factory EHR (Dortmund branch) and the US subsidiary Meridium (Walldorf) in Pelindaba the production of the nuclear fuel for the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR), a heavily armed attack on the control center of the nuclear research center took place on November 8, 2007.

Four gangsters stormed straight to the instrument panel of the nuclear facility and seriously injured the responsible manager with gunshots. In this context, it has only now become known that an armed attack also took place in June 2007 in which another manager was gunned down.

Spiegel Online reported the last attack on 11/11/2007: “Two of the four armed men had gained access to an electronically locked control room and stormed towards the dashboard, reports the newspaper 'Saturday Star'. They shot the responsible manager Anton Gerber in the chest - and disappeared shortly afterwards. "

According to the official government philosophy, Pelindaba is one of the safest places in the Republic of South Africa, which is plagued by the most serious and extremely frequent crime. How the perpetrators managed to get into the nuclear control center is not yet entirely clear. After all, not only had various checkpoints with video surveillance, but also electronic fences and security systems to be overcome.
The South African newspaper "Pretoria News" reported that an employee of the facility heard a loud bang in the east block and that the attackers could have used a fire ladder on the outside of the building to gain access to a window, which was then opened with force. During the subsequent fighting in the control center, the responsible manager was critically injured by two bullets that barely missed the heart and spine.

International embarrassment
The attackers were able to flee after the attack. But what did they want in the nuclear research center? "Die Welt" reported and tried on 11/11/2007 to figure out the whole matter:

“A police spokesman confirmed that the criminals were being searched for. So far there have been no arrests. The incident had already occurred on Thursday. The motives of the perpetrators who fled undetected remained unclear.

More than six atomic bombs were built in Pelindaba during the apartheid period, but they were defused before the democratic turnaround in the Cape. According to officially unconfirmed information, the weapons-grade uranium is still on the site of the plant under international supervision and is used for medical purposes for the production of isotopes. (...)
In the past, the rampant high violence in the host country of the soccer World Cup 2010 did not stop at facilities with the highest security level such as embassies or airports. "

The general Swiss military magazine ASMZ wrote on November 10.11th. 2007: “Opposition politicians criticized the incident as a serious threat to the security of the country. 'If Pelindaba fell into the hands of terrorists, the security of the entire country could be endangered,' said Dianne Kohler Barnard, MP of the Democratic Alliance. "

This embarrassment comes at an extremely inopportune time: South Africa is currently preparing to take over the chairmanship of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is supposed to prepare a convention that will ensure a high level of international nuclear safety and effective security against nuclear facilities should effect. It doesn't get more grotesque!

South Africa: Criminal nuclear supermarket
Only three days later, after the current gangster attack on the South African nuclear research center in the FRG became known, the AP news agency reported that the "father of the Pakistani atomic bomb" had been commissioned for decades, Abdul Quadeer Khan, active nuclear smugglers Gotthard Lerch After the formal failure of previous processes, he still has to answer to the Stuttgart Higher Regional Court for alleged involvement in the development of the Libyan nuclear weapons program. His main base of operations for the development and construction of centrifuges for the manufacture of atomic bombs was South Africa. The construction plans came from Khan, who used them as an employee of the German-Dutch group URENCO (Gronau / Almelo) illegally stolen there in the 70s. 

AP reported on November 14, 11: “He had the centrifuge parts manufactured in South Africa. A cargo ship with components was stopped on the way to Libya in 2007, the delivery was thwarted. The engineer received around 2003 million marks (around 55 million euros) for his services, it was said. According to the public prosecutor's office, the amount also paid for the manufacture of the centrifuges. "

The High temperature reactor PBMR is developed in South Africa especially for export to emerging countries. As a result, more and more states come into possession of uranium, which greatly increases the risk of proliferation. South Africa was not only a hub of international nuclear smuggling during the apartheid regime, it is still today. The current incidents in Pelindaba and the actual construction of nuclear weapons of mass destruction show that the police, courts and government have failed to dry up the atomic swamp in recent years.

With the construction of the PBMR, which is being realized with the help of the German companies NUKEM, Uhde, SGL Carbon, Essener High Pressure Röhrenwerk (EHR) and Meridium, future nuclear scandals and possibly even nuclear wars are becoming more likely. - Who are the real nuclear gang here?

Update:

A week after the worst attack on a nuclear facility in recent history, some new details are revealed. The South African security authorities are obviously still in the dark.
According to “The Times” of November 14, 2007, another group of attackers was located in the western part of the facility and fled undetected after an exchange of fire.

The first group of four armed men seized a computer, which was then left on a balcony near the control center. It is not yet known whether the hard drive has been removed. On the South African websites of various newspapers it was stated that the perpetrators must have been extremely familiar with the nuclear facility. Just one highly specialized group with inside knowledge could therefore have been able to turn off alarm systems and overcome all barriers. The perpetrators apparently knew exactly where they wanted to take action.
The South African reports repeatedly refer to the atomic bombs that had been armed here up to 1993 and ask whether the two attacking groups wanted to combine and combine two different components (bomb and ignition or start codes) with extremely destructive intent. And what information was still on this computer today. It would really be a fatal mistake if both components were positioned so close to each other and obviously so easily accessible!

Or did the gangsters want to steal certain material or information? The data stored in the computer could be useful for international terrorism.

Further inconsistencies are discussed in the South African press: What was the fiancée of the seriously injured chief nuclear engineer Anton Gerber doing in the highly sensitive part of the facility at the time of the attack? How seriously are Gerber's statements before the attack that he expected "trouble" to be taken. Did he know anything?

The six-person security personnel at this part of the facility, including their boss, were dismissed after the attack. They and the way they work will be the subject of an investigation. Were there any leaks or accomplices?

The faces of the attackers are only vaguely visible on the surveillance videos. There is no trace of the perpetrators. - It has become an extremely embarrassing matter for the South African nuclear industry and the state. The environmental protection organization Earthlife Africa was even quoted in the New York Times with its critical statement. One can look forward to the progress of events.

The THTR circular contains articles on the following companies:
On NUKEM: No. 101 (2005), 107 (2006) and 110 (2007).
About Uhde: No. 100 (2005), 101 (2005), 111 (2007)
About Essener high pressure pipe works (EHR): No. 110 (2007), 111 (2007), 112 (2007)
Regarding SGL Carbon: No. 102 (2005), No. 117 (2007)
On Meridium: No. 116 (2007)
On URENCO and Khan: No. 95 (2004), No. 99 (2005), No. 101 (2005), No. 104 (2006), No. 111 (2007)

While in the Netherlands the network of the "father of the Pakistani atomic bomb", Abdul Quadeer Khan, has become the subject of broad social discussion, in the FRG only sporadic and isolated reports can be found in selected newspapers. And this despite the fact that Germans and Swiss resident in South Africa are the main culprits.
 
When Libya began to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2003, the unscrupulous machinations were exposed: Already at the end of the 90s, the German engineer Gotthard Lerch prepared the delivery of a centrifuge system for the enrichment of weapons-grade uranium. Gerhard Wisser from Zurich took over the production of components and had them built in a factory in South Africa. In the following, the individual stages of the scandal are presented, although the end is far from in sight.

The journalist Wolfgang Frey wrote in the "Liechtensteiner Wirtschaftswochenzeitung" on July 28, 2007:

“While the investigations into the international nuclear mafia are not making good progress in Switzerland and Germany, a South African trial promises to be cleared up. Two people involved have already unpacked there.
Gerhard Wissers SMS to his partner Johan Meyer was clear: "The bird must be destroyed, feathers and everything." Shortly before, Libya's secret atomic bomb program had been exposed by a CIA intelligence operation and Wisser was evidently rightly concerned that the suppliers of atomic technology would soon be attacked. At least there were several containers with parts for the Libyan bomb production in the factory of Meyer's company in Vanderbijltpark, South Africa. Wisser made the seriousness of the situation clear in another SMS to Meyer: "They fed us to the dogs. (...)
In the meantime, however, the public prosecutor's office had tried to make the trial a secret, apparently to prevent details of its own secret nuclear weapons program from apartheid times from coming to light. Because some of those involved were involved in this too - already as suppliers. "

After the first atomic smuggling process in Mannhein failed in 2006, the process was reopened in South Africa this year. With surprising results. It is noteworthy that the judiciary tried to partially carry out the process in camera.

Ralf E. Krüger reported the following for "Der Tagesspiegel" on September 4th, 9:

“In South Africa today the accused of smuggling nuclear technology for Libya were in court. The 68-year-old German (Gerhard Wisser, the RB editorial team) confessed. He is said to have brokered a component for the Libyan nuclear weapons program.
Almost a year after the end of the world's first trial of an alleged smuggling of nuclear technology for Libya - in Mannheim - the bang came in a follow-up trial at the Cape. In return for a mild sentence, the accused German businessman not only confessed, but also pledged full cooperation with German and South African authorities. This increases the likelihood that the trial against another German manager, which failed in Mannheim in 2006, will be repeated. Because he was charged in distant Pretoria by his ex-business partner for having helped both Libya and Pakistan to achieve nuclear technology with a Sri Lankan resident in Dubai. "
According to AFP of September 4, 9, Wisser was sentenced to 2007 years probation and three years of house arrest. “According to the information, the judiciary will also collect the equivalent of 18 euros in cash and foreign assets of more than 600.000 million euros. The convict undertook to support the authorities of South Africa and other countries in their investigations against other members of the smuggling ring. "

Julia Raabe wrote on September 13, 9 in "Der Standard" about the progress of the investigation and about the unbelievable dimensions that represented the "greatest threat to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty":
With new investigations and the criminal prosecution of suspects, South Africa wants to push for the final breakdown of a smuggling ring for nuclear technology. Parts of the network around the Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, which was exposed in 2003, could still be active, warned the South African representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Abdul Minty, on the sidelines of the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna this week. "The illegal network is probably the greatest threat to the Non-Proliferation Treaty."

For years, the smuggling ring had sold nuclear technology beyond international control to states such as Libya, Iran and North Korea. The full extent of the clandestine dealings is still unknown to this day; the network operated in over 30 countries. It was blown when Libya was caught red-handed delivering nuclear technology and nothing could be denied. (...) Little seems to be known about the current activities of the ring. "There is no evidence of activity by the Khan network," said nuclear expert Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London the standard. "The people who are known to have been involved are out of business." There are, however, still unknown suppliers who are now keeping a low profile and who could become active again in the future. "

While it becomes clear that not all of the criminals and suppliers involved have been caught and that they are even involved in new nuclear activities, some of the caught perpetrators are trying to be released. This was reported by the “Neue Züricher Zeitung” on October 15, 10. The Swiss engineer who has been arrested since October 2007 on suspicion of illegal nuclear smuggling Urs Tinner must, however, remain in custody; the request for release from prison was denied.
On November 14, 2007, PR-Inside reported that Gotthard Lerch had to answer again before the Stuttgart Higher Regional Court after the failure of a trial in Mannheim. Tinner's trial is expected to begin on February 5, 2008 in Pretoria, South Africa. Sequel follows.

On Khan's nuclear supermarket and what the FRG, German companies, South Africa, Pakistan, Iran and Libya have to do with it, see also the following articles in the THTR circular:
No. 111 (2007): Khan's atomic smuggling and NRW companies
No. 104 (2006): Where Khan Learned to Love the Bomb
No. 99 (2005): The uranium centrifuges were almost finished in South Africa
No. 98 (2005): Khan supplied Iran
No. 95 (2004): The Atomic Triangle: Germany, South Africa, Pakistan (The much-cited article)

After the accident during shunting work in the Hammer train station, the question of safety for the Hammer population is increasing. Especially when transporting dangerous goods with uranium hexafluoride (UF-6) to the uranium enrichment plant in Gronau through Hamm.

The highly dangerous wagons were usually left unattended at the Hammer marshalling yard between around 23 p.m. and 5 a.m. at night. Exactly at the same time at 0.20 o'clock on November 6, 11, the accident happened in the same place: wagons jumped out of the tracks, cables were cut, power boxes knocked over, a switch, the rail bed and the overhead line damaged.

What would have happened if a derailed wagon had crashed into a UF-6 container that had been parked there for many hours?

The fire brigade and the city of Hamm would not have known at all that such a dangerous transport would pass through Hamm! Therefore, in the opinion of the citizens' initiative for environmental protection, the city of Hamm should in future insist that the operators of the uranium enrichment plant in Gronau inform them of the dangerous transports, so that the Hammer emergency services are warned and can take certain precautions.

After two inquiries from the citizens' initiative for environmental protection in Hamm and the Green Parliamentary Group and several protests, the Hamm city administration finally responded with a detailed statement (0809/07) on the transport of highly dangerous uranium hexafluoride through Hamm.

Our colleague Gerhard Piper from the Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security (BITS) has critically analyzed this statement and - briefly - came to the following results (they are documented in detail in the appendix):

1. According to the official information provided by the Hamm city administration, the Hammer fire brigade has no reconnaissance vehicle that could even detect contamination with the highly dangerous uranium hexafluoride.

2.  In view of the very limited and partially outdated potential (emergency vehicles from 1977 and 1982), the city administration's statement that the entire emergency response management of the city of Hamm is "definitely equipped or equipped according to the current state of the art" is incomprehensible.
 
3. The decision of the citizens' initiative that the fire brigade location at Rathenaustraße 16 is only a few meters from the location of the parked wagons with the uranium hexafluoride could not be invalidated by the administration. The distribution of the various sub-tasks for hazard prevention to different locations does not apply to NBC defense!

4. In the event of an accident-related failure of their equipment in Rathenaustraße, the Hammer fire brigade could only watch the disaster happening from a safe distance.

5. The radii of 50 to 100 meters for the danger and cordoned off areas specified by the Hamm city administration are merely tactical recommendations according to fire service regulation 500, which must be adjusted and expanded depending on the situation, taking particular account of the wind conditions. A cloud of pollutants containing uranium hexafluoride can spread for several kilometers!

6. The emergency services would need too much time to get ready before a uranium hexafluoride container burst open due to the journey, putting on special personal equipment and setting up the required decontamination tents.

7. The few existing ABC vehicles were to be relocated from Rathenaustraße, which should not be an insurmountable financial problem.

8. The exercise with a simulated UF-6 accident proposed by the city administration is to be welcomed. The interested public should be admitted as a spectator.

With the expansion of the uranium enrichment plant in the Westphalian town of Gronau for the fuel production of over 30 nuclear power plants, which has now begun, the transport of uranium hexafluoride will increase many times over. This state is the opposite of an exit! Ultimately, only the shutdown of all nuclear facilities can reduce the potential danger for the population.

This article was printed only slightly abbreviated as a letter to the editor in WA on November 14, 2007 and also published in issue 185 of "anti atom aktuell" (www.anti-atom-aktuell.de).

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