Uranium transports across Europe

International uranium hexafluoride tourism through Germany

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By Gerhard Piper, published on June 30.06.2007, XNUMX in www.telepolis.de
The author is a research fellow at the 'Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security' (BITS)

For years, secret atomic trains have been driving tons of uranium hexafluoride through Germany. So far overlooked by the public, fearful protest is now stirring in the cities and towns along the railway lines.

While the six-monthly Castor transports from La Hague in France to Gorleben have been shocking a massive protest movement for years, hardly anyone has been interested in the secret nuclear transports from Pierrelatte in France to the German uranium enrichment plant in Gronau. The nuclear waste from spent fuel obviously seems to excite people more than the transport of uranium hexafluoride, which is used to make new fuel rods. Anti-nuclear initiatives in the Ruhr area and Münsterland now want to expand the protest actions.

The time for protests seems propitious. It is true that the uranium hexafluoride trains have been traveling unnoticed through West Germany every two weeks for years, but apparently the transports stopped in December 2006. If the citizens' initiatives have their way, this stop should remain; but the opposite is to be feared. Currently expanded; in the future it should be two and a half times as large as before. Then the number of rail transports would also increase accordingly.

The remaining time is used by the nuclear opponents. Various environmental protection and anti-nuclear groups have formed against the uranium transports along the route. In France, around 700 anti-nuclear groups across the country formed the Bündis Réseau Sortir du Nucléaire. On the German side, the following initiatives are active, among others: Anti-nuclear group Stop Bure (Trier), Initiative for nuclear phase-out (Trier), Greenpeace (Bonn), Bund für Umwelt- und Naturschutz (Bonn), Group People Against Nuclear Plants (Lünen), Citizens' Initiative Environmental Protection (Hamm), group for the immediate nuclear phase-out (Münster), citizens' initiative "No atomic waste" (Ahaus) and finally the working group on the environment in Gronau.

Groups from both countries decided at a joint demonstration at the Perl border crossing on May 14, 2007 to set up a bilateral [external] observation network in order to initiate vigils and blockades along the entire route - similar to the Castor transports. In areas that are structurally weak in terms of movement policy (Rhineland-Palatinate, Bremen etc.) people are still being sought who are familiar with nuclear transport and who keep their eyes open. The individual pieces of information are then put together to form a joint puzzle, so that gradually an overall picture of the uranium hexafluoride transport is created. For example, the environmental and anti-nuclear groups are counting on a "surveillance state from below" against the nuclear policy of the federal government, which supposedly primarily has the economic interests of the electricity companies in its sights:

In a statement by "Contranetz", an association of nuclear opponents in Lower Saxony, it says:

"It is of enormous importance to offer resistance right at the beginning of the atomic spiral and not only when the uranium has become highly radioactive nuclear waste. If the transport of uranium to Gronau comes to a standstill, the further steps of the atomic spiral will also be made more difficult An international network between German and French organizations and activists will be established, as has been the case with the Castor transports from / to La Hague for years. The focus is on collecting information about the transports: dates, routes, security, etc. Of course, the organization of protests along the railway line. (...) Let's intervene in the nuclear spiral and dry out the UAA in Gronau. "

Because the processing of uranium hexafluoride in Gronau leaves nuclear waste, which Urenco simply ships to Russia, Russian environmental groups have joined the international protest movement.

Uranium hexafluoride

The naturally occurring uranium ore consists essentially of the industrially insignificant uranium238 and only contains 0,7 percent uranium235, from which fuel elements for nuclear power plants or nuclear material for atomic bombs are made. Therefore, the heavy metal has to be extracted from the uranium ore and then uranium235 has to be separated from uranium238. As long as both isotopes are in solid form, separation would be impossible, so the uranium ore is first processed into uranium hexafluoride (UF6).

This "natural" uranium hexafluoride consists of fluorine atoms that have bonded with uranium 99,3 atoms in 238 percent of the cases and with uranium 0,7 atoms in 235 percent of the cases. This type of uranium hexafluoride is called a "feed". It is a crystalline white substance that becomes gaseous when heated to 56,5 degrees and can thus be fed into a uranium enrichment plant (UAA). There the "feed" is separated: Enriched uranium hexafluoride contains at least 5 percent fluorine uranium 235 molecules and is called "product". What remains is uranium hexafluoride, 99,7 of which consists of fluorine-uranium238 compounds. This nuclear waste is known as the "tail".

Uranium hexafluoride is neither flammable nor explosive, but it is a gamma emitter and highly toxic. Its radioactive radiation is only weak, but with a uranium half-life of 4,5 billion years, an area that has been irradiated remains permanently contaminated. Upon contact with water, uranium hexafluoride forms hydrofluoric acid (HF), a colorless gas with a pungent odor. Hydrofluoric acid is even more corrosive than hydrochloric acid and very toxic. Because the skin absorbs the acid quickly, poisoning is sometimes not noticed immediately. The tissue dies and the bones begin to decompose. Ulcers develop that are difficult to heal. Inhaling hydrofluoric acid causes pulmonary edema. The medical treatment is carried out with calcium gluconate or glucocorticoid aerosol.

Nuclear facilities in Pierrelatte

The French city of Pierrelatte on the Rhone north of Marseille is the location for two nuclear plants of the French atomic group Areva NC (formerly Compagnie Générale de Matières Nucléaires - Cogema). Comurhex is the name of a plant for converting uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) into uranium hexafluoride (UF6). The capacity of the plant was around 1990 tons in 12.000.

Part of the uranium hexafluoride is processed in Pierrelatte itself, in the gas diffusion plant "Georges Besse 1", into highly concentrated nuclear material (degree of enrichment 90 percent) for the French nuclear forces. Another part is exported to Germany to the Gronau uranium enrichment plant (UAG 1) in order to produce fuel elements for all German light water reactors. The factory in Pierrelatte is now to be expanded by a gas centrifuge system "Georges Besse 2", which has a correspondingly greater demand for uranium hexafluoride. It is still unclear whether this will affect nuclear exports to Germany.

The atomic train

On the German side, the rail journeys are carried out by Nuclear Cargo + Service GmbH (NCS). The company in Rodenbach has 120 employees and an annual turnover of 40 million euros; Deutsche Bahn AG sold its subsidiary to the French company in April 2007. Hence SA. The aim of the rail transport is the uranium enrichment plant in Gronau on the German-Dutch border. The UAG-1 started operations in 1985. Since then, nuclear shipments have been rolling through towns and cities. Sometimes there was a train every week, sometimes they ran every fortnight. However, the nuclear opponents have not been able to observe any further transport since December 6, 2006. The reason for the sudden stop is not known. If the transports are better camouflaged, you take a different route, if you have switched from the train to a truck, the camps in Gronau are e.g. Currently filled, are there any particular safety concerns? So far, the citizens' groups have not yet found a reliable answer to these questions.

A DB class "232 Ludmilla" diesel locomotive was used as the locomotive. The trains were not always the same length: the transport on July 12, 2006 consisted of six wagons, while the train on December 6, 2006 consisted of seven wagons. Sometimes open flat wagons, sometimes covered tarpaulin wagons were used. According to Urenco Deutschland (DU), it transported around 130 wagons with a total of 380 containers from Pierrelatte to Gronau every year, the opponents of nuclear power even spoke of 260 wagons. Each wagon [external] contained up to three containers of 12,5 tons each of uranium hexafluoride. As a warning, all wagons were marked with the international radioactivity symbol (black impeller on a yellow background) and the corresponding UN hazardous substance number "2978", so that in the event of an accident the fire brigade and police would have recognized immediately that there was a particular danger. The dangerous goods are just so explosive that the state's confidentiality policy reached its limits here.

Since the capacities of the uranium enrichment plant in Gronau are currently being expanded from 1800 tons of uranium separation work to 4500 tons annually, a resumption and a corresponding increase in transports can be expected: "In future, the railways will also be used more," said Dr. G. Meyer-Kretschmer, Managing Director of Urenco Deutschland GmbH, in March 2001.

On the French side, the trains started in Pierrelatte and then passed Lyon, Dijon, Nancy and Metz. In Perl-Apach (Moselle valley) they crossed the German-French border. From there, the transports passed through the following cities: Trier-Ehrang, Koblenz, Bonn-Beuel, Cologne, Düsseldorf, Duisburg, Oberhausen, Gelsenkirchen, Recklinghausen, Dortmung-Datteln, Lünen, Hamm, Dülmen, Coesfeld and Ahaus to the destination stations Gronau or the suburb of Ochtrup. There used to be an alternative route from Hamm via Osnabrück and Nordhorn to Gronau. When they arrived at their destination, the containers were reloaded onto a security vehicle (SIFA) and driven to the uranium enrichment plant.

The journey times of the transports varied because these special trains had to be integrated into the current rail traffic by the dispatchers in the network control center of Deutsche Bahn AG or the cargo control center of Railion (both Frankfurt). The transports were monitored using the GPS system. In addition, the patrol service of the federal police monitored the transport of dangerous goods. However, opponents of nuclear power could repeatedly linger on the trains for hours without being checked. Occasionally the train "spent the night" at the marshalling yard in Hamm-Lohauserholz. On their roughly 900 km long journey, the trains were on the move for almost 24 hours in Germany alone.

Transport container

The American type "48´´-Y" (48 inch Ypsilon) transport containers used have a length of 3,80 m and a diameter of 1,22 m and a dead weight of 2,5 tons. They contain up to 12,5 tons of uranium hexafluoride. These are internationally standardized pressure vessels made of 16 mm thick steel, which are supposed to withstand the enormous mechanical loads in a car or train accident. In addition, the transport containers are again surrounded by protective packaging, the so-called overpack. In the airtight container, there is a negative pressure of 0,1 bar at a temperature of 20 degrees Celsius during transport, so that the uranium hexafluoride is always transported in crystalline powder form. According to Urenco, the radioactive radiation on the surface of the steel containers is around 2 milli-sieverts per hour (mSv / h), but this value is doubted by the anti-atomic groups.

The container is manufactured by Societe Francaise d´Isolation (Sofradi) in Treillières. The cylinder was subjected to various security tests (TENERIFE, PEECHEUR etc.) at the French Institut de Protection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IPSN). Another type approval test of the transport containers, as is otherwise customary in Germany by Section III.3 of the Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing (BAM) in Berlin-Steglitz, was omitted.

In addition, it became known that the containers in use are only checked for leaks every five years, even though UF6 is highly corrosive. According to the French test results, the containers withstand a "normal" fire (800 ° Celsius) without overpack - according to various statements - for between 25 and 50 minutes. Then the pressure rises to over 14 bar and the containers burst, suddenly a large part of the overheated uranium hexafluoride is released. Since Urenco has a branch in Great Britain, a license was obtained there for transport in European traffic in accordance with international guidelines. This approval has been confirmed for Germany by the Federal Institute for Radiation Protection in Salzgitter. Their "Section SE 1.1 Transports" is z. Currently by Dr. Frank Nitsche headed.

As the federal government itself had to admit on July 16, 2001, at least at that time the transport containers did not meet the "Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material" of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). "Therefore the transport of natural and depleted UF6 is to be classified as particularly questionable"; the federal government openly admitted.

Uranium enrichment plant in Gronau

In the Westphalian city of Gronau, Urenco Deutschland GmbH operates a uranium enrichment plant, owned by the electricity companies RWE Energie and E.ON. The delivered "natural" uranium hexafluoride is converted into uranium235 with an enrichment level of 5 percent. The enriched uranium hexafluoride is then transported to the fuel element factory [extern] Advanced Nuclear Fuels (ANF) in Lingen. The production capacities are sufficient to supply 35 nuclear power plants with fuel rods.

In addition to the existing uranium enrichment plant in Gronau (UAG 1), an additional UAG 2 is under construction for 800 million euros. The aim is to increase the annual uranium separation work from the current 1800 to 4500 tons. In addition, the storage capacities for "natural" uranium hexafluoride are being expanded. The foundation stone for the new factory was laid on September 14, 2005.

The nuclear waste train

For every ton of enriched uranium hexafluoride, seven tons of nuclear waste are produced from depleted uranium hexafluoride in a UAA. Some of this nuclear waste is stacked in an open warehouse on site. As part of the expansion of the UAA, this depot is to be supplemented by a huge warehouse. Another part of the depleted uranium hexafluoride is transported back to Pierrelatte on the same route [external] that the "natural" uranium hexafluoride was previously used. The Urenco exports the largest amount of nuclear waste (for final disposal) to Russia.

Since 2002, trains have been traveling from Gronau to Russia three to four times a year. The last transport took place on May 9, 2007. The trains run to the Netherlands via Burgsteinfurt, Münster, Emsdetten, Rheine and Bad Bentheim. From there it continues via Hengelo, Almelo, Utrecht and Gouda to Rotterdam. These transports were previously carried out by the private railway company Ahaus-Alstätter-Eisenbahn (AAE), since the beginning of 2007 the Bentheimer Eisenbahn AG (BE), based in Nordhorn, has been carrying out the journeys. Sometimes a V100, sometimes a Ludmilla, is used as the locomotive. The trains are of different lengths. The last transport consisted of 19 tarpaulin wagons plus one passenger wagon with an escort from the Federal Police. In Rotterdam, the containers are loaded onto transport ships. It used to be the freighter "Mont Louis", after which it sank off the Belgian coast in 1984, the Dutch "MV Doggersbank" is in service. The sea voyage to Saint Petersburg takes about five days. In Russia, the containers are reloaded onto railroad trains. The destinations are the uranium enrichment plants in Novouralsk, Seversk, Zelenogorsk and Angarsk in Siberia.

In the Russian enrichment plants, the depleted uranium hexafluoride is enriched with the remaining quantities of uranium235 to such an extent that uranium hexafluoride with a uranium235 content of 5 to 6 percent is recovered. This is then processed into fuel elements etc. or transported back to Gronau or Lingen (so far a total of 1.700 tons) by the Moscow export company Techsnabexport. At least until a few years ago, these ship passages were handled via Bremerhaven. The remaining nuclear waste (19.300 tons) is permanently dumped in open air storage facilities in Russia and is harmful to the health of the local population.

The former worker Alexander Boltatschow reported to the ZDF magazine Frontal 21 about the conditions in the open warehouses near Tomsk.

"There are thousands of containers with the uranium hexafluoride in a huge space. They rust under strong temperature changes. In summer it is hot here. In winter everything freezes below 40 degrees. Rain, snow, everything breaks these containers. Cracks form. And then you try to weld these cracks shut. (...) The uranium hexafluoride poses a serious danger. But the topic is avoided. In our closed city everything is kept quiet and kept top secret. "

But Russian citizens' groups no longer want to accept that in the age of globalization Germans simply sell their nuclear waste abroad. Therefore, in November 2006 the Russian environmental protection organization Ecodefense filed a criminal complaint (file number 540 Js 1814/06) against Urenco Deutschland GmbH and the politically responsible federal government with the public prosecutor in Münster. After the public prosecutors did not want to initiate an investigation, Ecodefense is currently preparing a lawsuit at the Higher Administrative Court in Hamm.

Security precaution

There are various laws and ordinances to secure such dangerous goods transports. Mention should be made here of the Framework Act on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (GGBefG), the Railway Hazardous Goods Ordinance (GGVE), the Radiation Protection Ordinance (StrlSchVO), etc. The transport trains must arrive at the Federal Railway Authority (EBA) in Bonn and the Ministries of the interior of the federal states concerned (Saarland, Rhineland-Palatinate and North Rhine-Westphalia) must be registered. At the EBA, the "Section 48 Tank Car Approval, Monitoring Dangerous Goods / Nuclear Transports" under the direction of Stefan Dernbach in Bonn and Minden is responsible for approving the transports. In addition, the EBA carries out its own controls on the transport of dangerous goods.

In a brochure published by the Federal Ministry of Transport in 2004, it says:

"The EBA is the authority responsible for monitoring the transport of dangerous goods by rail within the federal railways. Monitoring is currently carried out by around 60 inspectors at the EBA's branch offices. Modern office vehicles are used for flexible and mobile control tasks the Federal Railway Authority Information System for Hazardous Goods Monitoring (EBIS-GGÜ), software and modern information technology developed on a database basis is used, which is supported by notebooks, scanners and digital cameras.

Political responsibility lies with the Federal Ministry of Transport (Section A33 (B) Transport of Dangerous Goods, Dangerous Goods Transport Advisory Board or Section E 15 (BN) Railway Technology, Operational Safety, Environmental Protection), the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Working Group P II 4 Protection of Nuclear Transport, etc. under the direction of the Ministerial Council) Hammerl), and the Federal Environment Ministry (Department of Security of Nuclear Facilities, Radiation Protection, Nuclear Supply and Disposal under the direction of Ministerialdirigent Wolfgang Renneberg).

The Federal Police is responsible for safety in rail traffic and cross-border controls. Their NBC forces are not assigned to the railway police, but to the federal police departments. The police forces of the federal states also take part in monitoring the transport of dangerous goods. The police are more likely to focus on road than rail transport. In Saarland, 6 officers form the dangerous goods troop at the traffic police inspection (VPI). In Rhineland-Palatinate, 56 officials from the Central Traffic Control and the Police Motorway Service are responsible. North Rhine-Westphalia employs around 300 specially trained police officers at the 50 district police authorities and the 5 motorway police stations. The information systems "Transec-Check" and "Fire" as well as the "Information and Communication System Hazardous / Environmentally Relevant Substances" (IGS) are available to them for controls.

Should a train accident occur, the operations center (BZ) of the responsible regional railway area, in this case RB Mitte in Frankfurt or RB West in Duisburg, would alert all rescue-relevant institutions (police, fire brigade, rescue services, THW etc.). In addition, the railway security center at the corporate headquarters in Berlin would be alerted, which would then assemble a central crisis team.

As stated in a declaration by the Federal Government of March 23, 1999, the disaster control authorities are not informed in advance of the transports:

"The notification procedure agreed by mutual agreement between the federal government and the states provides that the situation centers of the interior ministries of the states that are affected by the transport receive the 48-hour report. According to the interior ministries, the 48-hour reports are only sent to the supervisory and police authorities concerned - not passed on to cities and municipalities or regional fire brigades and disaster control services - because, from a safety point of view, precautionary measures on the part of the local administrative authorities are not required when transporting radioactive materials. "

Dangers in the event of an accident

Since the start of the transports, there has been no major accident in Germany, and little is known about the number of smaller incidents. According to the Federal Railway Authority, defects occur in less than 1 percent of all journeys. When a nuclear train stopped at the freight depot in Trier on June 28, 2006, a radiation measuring device installed there hit a neighboring junkyard. A nuclear train has already had an accident in the USA: On June 2, 1999, two wagons of a uranium hexafluoride train derailed near the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in the US state of Ohio; the containers remained undamaged. However, there have been repeated accidents with uranium hexafluoride in nuclear laboratories, including deaths.

In addition, a terrorist attack cannot be ruled out. Let us remind you of the failed "suitcase bombs" attacks on the Cologne-Koblenz and Cologne-Hamm regional trains on July 31, 2006. If the propane gas bombs had exploded, they would not only have destroyed the passenger trains affected, but possibly also neighboring goods or goods can even affect the transport of dangerous goods. Various scenarios for a direct attack on a uranium hexafluoride train are conceivable. As far as the fire hazard is concerned, the nuclear trains are relatively safe because only the diesel locomotive, the tarpaulin and a bit of lube oil can burn, but assassins could park a tanker or two on the track bed at an unguarded level crossing in order to provoke a disaster.

Even the capacity of the transport container represents a potential hazard. Should a single cylinder leak due to a wall crack or damage to the filling valve, up to 12,5 tons of uranium hexafluoride could be released, which then reacts chemically with the humidity. This creates solid uranyl fluoride (UO2F2), which collects on the ground at the accident site, and hydrofluoric acid. This corrosive and toxic acid would be ingested orally (through the respiratory tract) or percutaneously (through the skin). In addition, a small amount of radioactivity would be released. There are different assessments of the exact extent of the danger:

According to Urenco, such a dangerous goods accident would be easy to control:

"In the event of a container leak, air would flow into the container first. The chemical reaction between the uranium hexafluoride and the humidity would begin. This reaction is not violent, so no overpressure will build up in the container. To stop the chemical reaction and the release of hydrofluoric acid , it is sufficient to prevent further air from entering the container. For this purpose, a seal with appropriate bandages made of PVC foil, which is applied with plastic adhesives, is sufficient. An initial leak seal would be carried out by the fire brigade directly at the scene of the accident Accidents involving UF6 transports can be obtained from the so-called "ERI-Cards" (Emergency Response Intervention-Cards), a standardized European accident system for the transport of dangerous goods in the chemical industry ten the Urenco. "

However, Urenco must also admit that there are significant environmental hazards in the event of a fire close to the ground:

"In this case, the container could slowly heat up, the pressure in the container could rise and the uranium hexafluoride could even become liquid. Only then could the container tear open and a greater release of uranium hexafluoride could occur."

The radiation protection technician Helmut Hirsch also warned of the dangers of uranium hexafluoride transport in a brochure published by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management in Vienna in 2007:

"With a type 48 ?? Y container, failure occurs after around 50 minutes in a fire with a flame temperature of 800 ° C. At higher flame temperatures (1000 ° C and more can certainly be reached) failure occurs earlier Steel cylinder bursts, part of the UF6 is thrown high into the air, the rest is thrown in chunks into the surrounding area. A reaction with the water content of the air produces HF (hydrofluoric acid), among other things. Hydrofluoric acid is both a heavy breath and contact poison. In In the immediate vicinity of the scene of the accident (up to approx. 100 m away) there is an acute danger to life. Up to 500 m away people will be exposed to severe poisoning and chemical burns from HF. If you stay longer in this area, there is still danger to life. Even at distances of over 1 km there is a risk of health damage for sensitive people, the short-term health and sometimes fatal consequences of an attack on one of them Transport like that, especially while it is driving through a metropolitan area, can be drastic just because of the release of hydrofluoric acid. Thousands of dead and injured are possible. In addition, there is the contamination of the accident environment by uranium, a relatively weakly radioactive but chemically toxic heavy metal. (...) In the event of an attack in a rural area, serious damage to the flora and fauna affected is to be expected. "

In a parliamentary question from the Die Linke parliamentary group to the Federal Government on April 27, 2007, it says:

"In the event of an accident involving a UF6 transport in which UF6 is released, it is feared that life-threatening concentrations will occur up to at least two kilometers from the scene of the accident."

After computer simulations, Wenzel Brücher and Martin Sogalla from the nuclear-friendly Society for Plant and Reactor Safety (GRS) come to the conclusion in a "radiological consequence analysis" that "life-threatening damage to health due to the chemotoxic effects of UF6 and its derivatives, depending on the conditions of spread must be expected even at a distance of a few kilometers from the release site.

And from Russia [external] the environmental protection organization Ecodefense reported:

"The official documents also reveal that all people within a 1 km radius would die if a container of Urenco nuclear waste were to leak. (...) Within a 30 km radius, the probability of either dying or developing cancer increases . "

In any case, there is only little time left for emergency measures, after all, an incipient fire in a wagon must first be observed by someone and reported to the fire brigade. A few more minutes pass before the fire brigade arrives at the scene of the accident, where the unit leader first has to get an overview of the accident and the danger situation. In the event of a train accident, it must be assumed that several scattered containers were destroyed at the same time. As soon as he realizes that it is an ABC situation, he alerts the next ABC train. It usually consists of members of the volunteer fire brigade who first have to be mobilized. In the meantime, within the scope of his technical possibilities, the operational leader follows the rather general instructions of the fire service regulation FwDv 500 ABC-Dienst. In the event of a fire, fire fighting begins with foam extinguishing agents.

Since the civil protection services are not informed in advance about the transport of dangerous goods, they cannot prepare for an incident in a targeted manner. Every incident hits the emergency services without any warning. If the train was parked in a deserted marshalling yard at night, the fire brigade may only be alerted after a caustic, radioactive cloud of poison has already spread over the neighboring residential area. In addition, there is often a lack of qualified staff, modern technical equipment, (realistic) deployment plans and appropriate training. In some cities, the local authorities only became aware of a request from the nuclear opponents that nuclear transports were being carried out by their commune at all. In other cases, the overwhelmed city administrations simply declared themselves "not responsible" and referred to the federal government. However, this formal legal argumentation is highly inadequate, since the local authorities would be primarily responsible on site in the event of a disaster.

Another particular problem arises in the Westphalian town of Hamm: The voluntary fire brigade's ABC train has its technical base right next to the marshalling yard at No. 16 Rathenaustraße of an atomic train, this spatial proximity could have devastating effects. It is possible that the firefighters rushing to the site would not even have access to their NBC protective equipment (an old VW T3 explorer, a modern Dekon-P, an ancient multi-purpose vehicle for decontamination and a new decontamination container) because their own base would already be contaminated. Only two roll-off containers for radiation protection and chemical protection remained available at the main station of the Hammer professional fire brigade. With these limited NBC resources, the firefighters would largely be doomed to inactivity and would have to wait for reinforcements from the neighboring districts of Ahlen, Soest and Unna. This would initially leave the affected population to their own devices.

In a statement from the Hammer city administration dated June 11, 2007 it is officially stated:

"The" correct "behavior of the population cannot be conclusively regulated with a large number of possible transports and associated scenarios, even with an accompanying information policy. (...) The catastrophe cannot be planned and develops its own processes, which the Emergency services must be responded to individually and in a targeted manner. "

Gerhard Piper, published on June 30.06.2007, XNUMX in www.telepolis.de
The author is a research fellow at the 'Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security' (BITS)

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