The THTR Circulars from 2007

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THTR Circular No. 111, March 2007

Our resistance is becoming more concrete

The demonstration of 400 people on February 3, 2007 in Münster was directed not only against the expansion plans in the Ahaus fuel element interim storage facility, the uranium enrichment plant (UAA) in Gronau and the uranium transports there, but also expressly included the protest against the renaissance of the high-temperature reactor line . On January 17th, Horst Blume, at the invitation of the SALZ education community and the WASG / PDS Dortmund, gave a lecture on the special role that North Rhine-Westphalia and the eastern Ruhr area play in the worldwide re-establishment of the HTR bankruptcy technology. The citizens' initiative movement against nuclear power plants is non-partisan, but if parties want information from us or even work with us, then that's a good thing.

Uhde in focus

In Dortmund, the Uhde company and Essener high-pressure pipeline construction (EHR) are involved with their Dortmund branch in the construction of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) in South Africa. Understandably, there was initially a certain need for discussion in Dortmund. The realization that making money by building a death technology is simply immoral has to go through several stages in the brains of unionists before the penny (hopefully) falls.

The critical voices about Uhde's nuclear commitment are mounting. On January 19, 1, in its speech at the ThyssenKrupp shareholders' meeting, including Uhde, the umbrella association of critical shareholders referred to the planned THTR building in South Africa in detail in front of around 2007 shareholders: "No less than the Nobel Peace Prize laureate and Archbishop Desmond Tutu said : "We do not need nuclear power. The world does not need nuclear power. Bringing radiation death to the present and future generations is unforgivable." Earthlife Africa is one organization in the project's impressive long list of national opponents. You write: "ESKOM, the South African energy company, is not a reliable partner. At the beginning of 2.000, the Cape region was plagued by severe power outages and only narrowly escaped a major reactor accident at the Koeberg nuclear power plant near Cape Town. One of the causes was apparently a bolt that damaged a turbine. Inadequate maintenance work in the nuclear power plant also contributed to the problem. Due to the failures, there is always a dispute between ESKOM and the national atomic authority - NNR, which accuses ESKOM of negligence in handling the system. (...). "

It is also interesting in this context that the deal by Uhde's parent company ThyssenKrupp to supply military electronics for military frigates to South Africa - including the compulsory corruption allegations that the Düsseldorf public prosecutor is investigating - was discussed in the speech. So this "clean" corporation has several deadly irons in the fire.

It was very gratifying for us as a THTR citizens' initiative that several groups were willing to use Uhde as the starting point for the car parade to the demonstration in Münster and thus to support our work in practice. Before Uhde and at the two interim rallies in Lünen and Lüdinghausen, the various speakers addressed the problem of HTR technology several times and a reprint of the THTR circular on Uhde was distributed to interested parties. While we were standing in front of the entrance door in front of Uhde, a Uhde spokesman instructed the filming WDR to leave the company premises and go about their work from a distance on the sidewalk. We hope, of course, that Uhde will continue to be very unfriendly to media representatives ... Unfortunately, the Dortmund Greens did not take part in the protest in Dortmund, although the office, almost all elected officials, districts and working groups were invited in dozen of emails in good time. Here we will have to "knock" a little more energetically in the future. The media response in the various cities, including several television reports in the local time Dortmund and Münster, was very encouraging. It is also gratifying that over 40 people took part in the intermediate rally in Lünen and showed their willingness to take part in further activities.

The other side is not idle either. The EHR are trying to influence politics in a targeted and direct manner in order to do more business with the construction of nuclear plants. For example, Hempelmann, the spokesman for the SPD parliamentary group on energy policy, visited the EHR last year for an informational talk about which the employee magazine NEWS 2/2006 reported. He "... was impressed by the technological competence and the sophisticated production facilities of the EHR. (...) The political decision in Germany to phase out nuclear power plant technology is harmful for companies and incomprehensible from a technological point of view. The practical one Domestic use and export opportunities in the world energy market are directly related and decisive for the future. (...) Mr. Hempelmann takes the arguments with him to Berlin, where they will hopefully contribute to a change in energy policy in Germany. " - Thank you for the frank words about how energy policy decisions are made here in the FRG. And we now know that, when the opportunity arises, we also have something to say emphatically to Mr. Hempelmann. So we have come a step further in our resistance in Dortmund and the eastern Ruhr area. Here, where so far largely unnoticed the nuclear industry is producing and working out the individual parts for death technology, we have to start, get on them and mobilize the public. The factory gates are no longer a quiet hinterland for the nuclear industry!

Horst Blume

An important reason for the demonstration on February 3rd was the numerous dangerous uranium transports to Gronau. Last year, members of our citizens' initiative, equipped with boots, flashlights and cameras, were often out and about at night to inspect the security measures in Hamm near the train station. But there was no such thing! Since the mayor's office swallowed up half a dozen attempts to contact and talk, we are now showing that we can do different things. Now the administration is allowed to work through a three-page, detailed catalog of questions that we submitted to the complaints committee. It has already been reported in the Westfälischer Anzeiger, the Sunday newspaper and in Radio Lippewelle. We have the right to speak at the upcoming committee meeting and of course we will comment on the administration's response and, if necessary, ask further questions. Here we only print the "Foreword", the entire questionnaire can be found on our website:

"Trains with the highly dangerous uranium hexafluoride (UF-2001) on the way to the Gronau uranium enrichment plant (UAA) have been passing through the city of Hamm since at least 6. Moselle valley) and drives via Trier, Koblenz through the Rhineland and Ruhr area to take a break in Hamm at night.

Members of the Hamm e. V. found that every 2 to 3 weeks such a train spends several hours on the station premises and may be relocated. Some wagons are covered with tarpaulin, some are not. There are only tiny warning signs with radioactivity signs on the chassis. In addition to the wagons with radioactive content, others that may have been loaded with chemicals were observed. With great concern we noticed several times that even at night there was no guard or police presence in the vicinity of the uranium raft. In the immediate vicinity of this nuclear cargo, however, passenger trains with numerous people passed the tracks.

According to information from the Westfälische Rundschau on December 13, 12, 2006 wagons per year reach the Gronau uranium enrichment plant (one third of which is owned by the energy suppliers RWE Energie and E.ON Kernkraft via the Uranit company). However, this only applies to the current amount of 260 t uranium separation work. After the approval granted in 1800 for the expansion of the nuclear facility to 2005 t of uranium separation work, the amount of uranium hexafluoride to be transported will also very soon multiply and the risk potential will increase dramatically again.

When UF-6 escapes from the tanks on the wagons, it reacts with the moisture in the air to form the highly toxic hydrofluoric acid. This hydrofluoric acid is more aggressive than sulfur, nitric or hydrochloric acid and is fatal even in small amounts. It can be absorbed through the airways and skin. Because of its gaseous state, this substance spreads quickly into the environment. "

It has to be cheap, cheap, cheap for RWE to increase its profit. We are talking about the guarding of the bankruptcy reactor THTR. So far, the 18 security guards were employed by the company Wach- und Kontrolldienst Nord (Wako), which according to the "Westfälischer Anzeiger" of December 21, 12 is "reputable and fair in dealing with employees". Obviously, this company has become too expensive for RWE and since the beginning of 2006 the "industry giant Dussmann will take over this service". Ver.di district manager Ralf Bohlen said to the WA: "The situation is currently very difficult. I am worried about my colleagues and the monitoring of the systems." The new THTR guards, some of whom will be the old ones, will probably no longer get their current industry-unusual "top salary" of 2007 euros an hour, but have to be satisfied with less. And everyone knows what the consequences will be: less wages mean less quality, means poorer guarding of the nuclear ruins. RWE are trying to save on security themselves. At over 12 million euros, the THTR's decommissioning is expensive enough. And in just two years, the cost of taking over the decommissioned operation will be renegotiated. Of course, the taxpayer is allowed to pay most of it. In order to keep costs down, there is only one thing left to do: save, save, save. How about security in 5 or 20 years, if this continues?

URENCO, with its locations in Gronau, Almelo and Capenhurst, has now come into the public eye not only because it produces the nuclear fuel for many dozen nuclear power plants in Europe, moves nuclear waste to Russia or because it is the destination for countless rail transports with the highly dangerous uranium hexafluoride (U -6) is. URENCO has posed a serious threat to world peace over the past few decades and is partly responsible for the fact that we are today on the threshold of the use of atomic bombs by terrorists and dictatorial states. While URENCO is addressing this responsibility on a broad level in the Netherlands, public perception of this fact is only now beginning in the Federal Republic of Germany. The new attention is mainly due to the journalist Egmont R. Koch, who with his book "Atomwaffen für Al Quaida" and various television programs drew attention to the help of unscrupulous European companies in the secret construction of the atomic bomb. The focus is on the uranium enrichment plants of URENCO and the Pakistani scientist Abdul Quadeer Khan, who has been able to acquire knowledge of building atomic bombs here since the early 70s without any major problems, stealing the construction plans and questioning those for the production of the countless individual parts locating upcoming companies. Many came from Germany and Switzerland. After Khan had supplied his home country Pakistan with his own uranium enrichment plant, he supplied Libya, Iran and North Korea with his "nuclear supermarket" in order to earn money himself.

So the global threat began with URENCO. Koch writes: "There, in the autumn of 1974, work began on the two modern types of centrifuge, the G1 and G2, which were invented by Nazi scientists for Hitler's ultimate nuclear weapon and which the Soviets developed after the war with the help of the same Nazi scientists Year, less than six months after his engagement as a Pakistani agent, Abdul Quadeer Khan was asked to translate the German-language documents of the G1 and G2 into Dutch. (...) During this time, Khan translated two parts of a twelve-part German report, who was classified as 'secret' was found out by the commission. What weighed much more heavily: The friendly, popular Pakistani was seen by the URENCO colleagues as 'one of their own', he went with them to the canteen next door for a coffee break, asked many specific questions so that he could possibly spy out 'all the technology of the German centrifuge', as later investigated report will be called. " (P. 64) - And that in the "brain box", in which every technician there had passed a month-long safety check - at least normally.

After only two years of intensive cooperation with numerous production companies, Khan was able to start transferring the explosive material: "At the end of April 1977, the first part of the caravan set out on the arduous journey to Pakistan. Migule (from the Company CES Kalthof, a contractual partner of Khan; HB) bought the system technology from 62 sub-suppliers in Europe, from the smallest screw to tubes from Mannesmann and cables from Siemens. Everything was properly cleared and even registered with the authorities in accordance with the guidelines for foreign trade statistics, however Incorrectly declared - as a fluorine factory for toothpaste production. " (P. 150) In order to see who in North Rhine-Westphalia apart from URENCO Gronau was still involved in the construction of an atom bomb for terrorist purposes and dictatorships, I picked out a few NRW locations from Koch's book as an exemplary example. The page numbers are in the brackets:

Düsseldorf

The export of "heavy water" had to be reported to the nuclear supervisory authority (IAEA) in Vienna if it was over a ton. The coveted substance was often traded past the controls just below this limit. "One of these dubious companies was the Düsseldorf 'Rohstoff-Import GmbH' of the former Nazi Alfred Hempel, and Munir Khan turned to him in his distress" (p. 61). And asked the Society for Nuclear Research in Karlsruhe whether they could do without something. The Federal Ministry of Research and Technology (BMFT), Euratom and the American Atomc Energy had already approved the deal. At the last moment, however, nothing more came of it due to foreign policy events. Since India detonated its first nuclear weapon on May 18, 5, this delivery route to Pakistan was closed. Other efforts, however, were more successful.

Cologne

The company Leybold-Heraeus AG from Cologne and Hanau has been targeted by public prosecutors and CIA analysts who have been observing global proliferation activities for decades due to a wide range of controversial deliveries of nuclear components. "... Leybold-Heraeus AG delivered a special furnace to Pyongyang that is suitable for the production of uranium centrifuges. Leybold-Heraeus was perhaps the most important contact point for Abdul Quadeer Khan in the Federal Republic of Germany at the time. And a later report said: Technician von Leybold-Heraeus were involved in the transfer of equipment and information to Pyongyang, and one or even two LH employees could be identified in 1989 and 1990 "(p. 238). This company, which was one of URENCO's most important suppliers, is currently making a name for itself in a current process. Your manager Gotthard Lerch (4), who also had excellent connections to South African nuclear companies, was extradited from Switzerland to German courts and has to answer for illegal nuclear smuggling to Libya. The process is still ongoing. In Khan's case, the delivery included "soldering ovens, welding machines, pumps, valves, and a gas cleaning system" (p. 83). We have already written more about this complex of topics in THTR circular nos. 95, 99 and 104.

Jülich

The Jülich company Uranit, connected to the URENCO Group via a holding company, is now a subsidiary of RWE Power AG and E.ON Kernkraft GmbH. In 1984 an espionage trial took place in the Netherlands in which Khan was sentenced to four years imprisonment in absentia for stealing top secret construction plans drawn up by uranite. The background: "When the Uranit experts received the drawings for analysis weeks later, most things looked familiar to them: The 'basic structure' of the uranium factory described in the documents corresponds to that of the modern URENCO plants in Almelo and Gronau '" (P. 160). "But the sentence, four years in prison, was to be collected again one and a half years later by the appellate authority - for formal reasons, because the accused was not served the complaint in time" (p. 134). And on the behavior of Uranit Koch wrote: "It was probably in the interests of the German URENCO partner to let the matter fall asleep. A stolen 'interpretation sheet for a mixed autoclave' was out of proportion to the possible damage to the image caused by reporting the would establish a connection with the Pakistani nuclear program "(p. 136).

Coesfeld

A small company from Coesfeld, not named by Koch, "which was one of the suppliers for the URENCO uranium factory" (p. 130), contributed to the uncovering of the espionage case described above. The construction drawings submitted by a Swiss company (Metallwerke Buchs, MWB) in Coesfeld for an offer corresponded almost exactly to those "that had been delivered by the Coesfelders to Gronau" (p. 130).

Dortmund

Khan procured the components for Libya's nuclear armament from Dortmund, among others. Namely from Tridelta Dortmund GmbH, which emerged from the company Thyssen Magnettechnik (Dortmund-Aplerbeck). So it was part of a network of companies to which Uhde also belongs, which is currently producing the nuclear fuel element factory for HTR in South Africa.
Tridelta produced the coveted ring magnets, which together with motors and inverters ("which are necessary to bring the rotors to their extremely high rotational speeds", p. 244), which were ultimately assembled in Istanbul (!) "And then shipped to Dubai , repacked there and shipped on to Libya "(p. 244). Only through the abandonment of Libyan nuclear ambitions in recent years and the associated subsequent disclosure of past activities did this involvement of Westphalian companies in nuclear bomb construction come to light.

Bonn

"The Pakistani military ruler Zia ul-Haq had sent his cousin Abdul Waheed as the new ambassador to Bonn with rare audacity, so that he would take care of the organization of supplies for P2, the second Pakistani enrichment facility in Kahuta" (p. 153). It was here that the meetings with key masterminds of the Khan nuclear network took place, some of which were filmed covertly by the US secret service. Some of the financial transactions required for this were processed through Commerzbank in Bonn.

It would be completely unrealistic to assume that Al Qaeda or states like Pakistan would have been able to independently build a nuclear weapon and use it successfully. Egmont R. Koch has shown in his book that German companies - especially those from North Rhine-Westphalia - were significantly involved in the development and construction of these inhumane weapons. And that the truth about the peaceful use of atomic energy is an outrageous lie. And above all: Without the German-Dutch uranium enrichment plants from URENCO, this disastrous development could not have taken its course. - Something similar can happen again at any time in the future. This is one of the reasons why the UAA Gronau has to be shut down!

Horst Blume

Egmont R. Koch "Atomwaffen für Al Qaida", 2005, Aufbau-Verlag, 348 pages, 19,90 euros

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